Water before uranium

What the IAEA Review of the Leonardville Project Means for Namibia, Russia and the Global Contest for Resources

A technical review has exposed unproven assumptions beneath a uranium project backed by the Russian state. The evidence points to hydrogeology, not conspiracy. The geopolitics begins where the science ends.

By Silas Mwaudasheni Nande

Beneath the red dunes of eastern Namibia lies water that the rain replaces very slowly. Farmers, small towns and livestock in one of the driest corners of Africa depend on it. A company owned by the Russian state wants to dissolve uranium inside that same rock.

On 10 November 2026, Namibian news feeds carried a report that sharpened the dispute. A technical review by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had found critical gaps in the case for the project. The developer, Headspring Investments, has not proved that its target aquifer is sealed from the drinking water above it (Namibia Headlines, 2026).

Headspring is a Namibian company owned by Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Rosatom, the nuclear corporation of the Russian state (Kaira, 2026). That ownership invites a hard question. Is the review sound science, or is it a political instrument aimed at Russian business in Africa?

This article tests that question against the record. It then asks whether Namibia is ready to regulate mining inside an aquifer. It closes with the meaning of the affair for the global contest over strategic minerals.

A caution on sources. The government has not yet published the review. The Stampriet Aquifer Uranium Mining Association (SAUMA) has demanded its release (Likoro, 2026). This analysis relies on detailed press accounts of the document, set against official records. The findings described below are reported findings until the full text is public.

A Dispute Fifteen Years in the Making

The story did not begin this month. Headspring has held eight exclusive prospecting licences in the Omaheke and Hardap regions since 2011 (Kaira, 2026). Drilling began in 2012. The deposit is known as the Wings project and lies near the village of Leonardville.

In November 2021 the water ministry withdrew two drilling permits from the company. In February 2024 the minister explained the decision to Parliament and asked for expert help from the IAEA and UNESCO (Schlettwein, 2024). In February 2026 the IAEA mission arrived.

In March 2026 the Environmental Commissioner, Timoteus Mufeti, clarified the status of the company. It holds an exploration licence and no mining licence. Its application is for an environmental clearance certificate to conduct four years of test mining (Kambaekua, 2026).

On 3 November 2026 Headspring announced that the government had authorised additional boreholes for groundwater study (Mining and Energy, 2026). SAUMA asked for the drilling to be placed on hold one day later. Within the week, the content of the IAEA review reached the press.

What the Review Reported

The review was not imposed on Namibia. The government requested it through the Ministry of Health and Social Services (Kaira, 2026). A team of external experts and agency staff examined the environmental impact assessment and the management plan of the company. The team visited Namibia from 10 to 13 February 2026. It met ministries, the developer and affected residents, and it inspected the proposed pilot site.

The proposed method is in situ leaching. An operator pumps a chemical solution into the rock that holds the uranium. The solution dissolves the metal and is pumped back to the surface. Nothing is dug out. Everything depends on the control of fluids that nobody can see.

According to the reported text, the review made 27 suggestions. Seven concern engagement with stakeholders and 20 concern technical matters (Kaira, 2026). Four findings carry the most weight.

First, confinement is asserted but not demonstrated. The project would operate in the Auob aquifer, which lies beneath the Kalahari aquifer. The company relies partly on regional geology and on conceptual assumptions, not on sufficient measurements at the site. The review is quoted as stating: “Demonstration of aquifer confinement and the ability to maintain hydraulic control are fundamental prerequisites” (The Extractor Magazine, 2026).

Second, the pathways for leakage are not adequately investigated. The reviewers asked for monitoring wells in the layers above and below the target zone. They asked for study of faults and fractures. They also pointed to existing and abandoned boreholes, which can connect layers that nature had separated.

Third, hydraulic control is not yet proven. The modelling does not account fully for regional groundwater gradients, pressure changes and pumping by other users. Warning thresholds and contingency procedures still need definition.

Fourth, the promise of restoration rests on thin evidence. The company assumes that affected groundwater can be restored in about six months. The reviewers consider the assumptions on time and water volume optimistic.

The review did not recommend approval or rejection. It applies only to the pilot and not to a future mine. It proposed a phased path. Regulators could permit monitoring wells and hydraulic tests that use natural formation water. No chemical would enter the ground until confinement is confirmed.

Are the Findings Realistic?

Four independent lines of evidence indicate that they are. The first is the geology. An assessment prepared under the UNESCO groundwater governance project describes the Stampriet system. Two deep, confined, artesian aquifers lie beneath an unconfined aquifer in the Kalahari sediments. The system covers 86,647 square kilometres. Recharge to the deep aquifers is negligible in normal years and arrives mainly during extreme rainfall. Such events occur roughly once in 30 years (“Governance of Transboundary Aquifers,” n.d.). Water that is replaced so slowly cannot dilute a mistake quickly.

The same assessment recorded a major deficit of data on the deep aquifers and called for more monitoring boreholes. The IAEA reviewers have therefore repeated, at the scale of one site, a weakness that hydrologists recorded for the whole basin about a decade ago.

The second line is the record of the Namibian government itself. The water ministry withdrew the two permits in 2021 because the company had breached permit conditions. The minister at the time, Calle Schlettwein, gave Parliament the details in 2024. Since 2012 the company had drilled about 600 exploration boreholes and 36 hydrogeological boreholes on 39 farms. Conditions on sealing and grouting had been ignored. He warned that drilling outside the specifications would destroy the confining layer between the two aquifers (Schlettwein, 2024).

That statement matters. The safety case of the project depends on an intact seal between the Auob and the Kalahari. The national regulator found, years before the IAEA arrived, that the developer had drilled through that seal without the required protection. The IAEA concern about old boreholes confirms a Namibian finding. It is not a foreign invention.

The third line is the status of the method. In situ leaching is not a fringe technique under attack. It produced about 55 per cent of world uranium in 2024. Uranium One produced about ten per cent of world output in that year. Its joint ventures in Kazakhstan are among the largest leaching mines in the world (World Nuclear Association, 2026b). A review that demands proof of confinement asks only what the method requires on every continent.

The fourth line is the conduct of the company. After the review, Headspring obtained authorisation to drill additional boreholes for groundwater study. Its managing director said the approval followed recommendations from the environment ministry and from IAEA experts. He confirmed that this phase would use no chemical reagents and that a revised pilot application would follow (Mining and Energy, 2026). A company that regarded the review as a political ambush would contest it. This company adopted it.

The reported findings are therefore realistic. They are also conservative. They describe what is unknown and prescribe how to find out.

Who Controls the IAEA?

The suspicion of political influence deserves a factual answer and not a dismissal. The agency is an intergovernmental body. Member states fund it and govern it.

Two organs set policy. The General Conference includes every member state. The Board of Governors has 35 members and meets five times a year. The Board appoints the Director General with the approval of the General Conference. Budget decisions require a majority of two thirds (Kerr & Nikitin, 2020).

Money gives Western states real weight. The United States is the largest contributor and has typically paid about 25 per cent of the regular budget. In 2020 China was assessed at about 11.5 per cent and the Russian Federation at about 2.4 per cent (Kerr & Nikitin, 2020). These are 2020 figures, and the current scale may differ.

Weight is not control. The Board for 2026 to 2027 includes the Russian Federation and China alongside the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It also includes Angola, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa and Togo (Odeyemi, 2026). Russia sits at the table where agency policy is made.

Russia is also present inside the secretariat. The Deputy Director General who heads the Department of Nuclear Energy is Mikhail Chudakov. He has held the post since February 2015. He was previously a deputy director general of Rosenergoatom, the Russian nuclear utility (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.). He was still speaking for the agency in June 2026 (TASS, 2026).

The loudest recent complaint about the IAEA has in fact been the opposite of the one now heard in Namibia. Ukrainian journalists pressed the Director General, Rafael Grossi, about his Russian deputy. Mr Grossi replied in January 2023 that international staff serve the agency and not a country (Espreso, 2023). An institution accused of leaning towards Moscow is an unlikely weapon against Moscow.

Rosatom itself treats the agency as an ally. At the Russia and Africa Summit in Moscow in late October 2026, its chief executive, Alexei Likhachev, spoke about Namibia. He said the leaching method “has been approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency” (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, 2026).

That statement goes further than the reported review, which approved nothing and found the safety case incomplete. It nevertheless shows where Moscow stands. Rosatom invokes the IAEA as a source of legitimacy.

The Namibian parliamentary committee that supports the project took the same view. Its members travelled to Moscow to engage Rosatom and the IAEA. They then asked for independent IAEA input on the pilot assessment (Agri Monitor, 2026).

One gap remains. The names and nationalities of the reviewers are not public. Nor is the identity of the agency department that led the work. Publication of the full report would settle both points.

On the available evidence, the theory of a political operation fails. Namibia requested the review. Russia helps to govern the agency. The review blocked nothing and offered a route forward. The developer followed that route. The head of the Namibian radiation authority, Axel Tibinyane, told the press that the IAEA only advises. He said that science, not politics, would decide (Kambaekua, 2026).

Politics enters by a different door. Every party now uses the review for its own purpose. That use is examined below.

Is Namibia Ready?

The review exposes the developer. It also exposes the state. Readiness has four parts: law, institutions, capacity and transparency.

The law is recent. Parliament passed the Water Resources Management Act in 2013. The Act and its regulations entered into force only on 29 August 2023 (Republic of Namibia, 2013). For most of the period in which Headspring drilled, the country still applied regulations made under the Water Act of 1956 (SADC Groundwater Management Institute, 2019).

The new Act is firm. Section 61 requires a borehole licence for any mineral exploration drilling that reaches the water table. The requirement applies whatever other authorisation a company holds (Schlettwein, 2024). The law is therefore adequate. The difficulty lies in the organs that must apply it.

Those institutions disagree with one another. The environment ministry issued clearance certificates for the exploration. The water ministry withdrew the drilling permits. The water minister told Parliament that the environmental assessment had largely ignored the freshwater aquifer and may be flawed (Schlettwein, 2024). In 2026, a parliamentary committee accused the water ministry of holding a large investment hostage for four years (Agri Monitor, 2026).

Three arms of one state have taken three positions on one project. An investor cannot plan in such conditions. Nor can a farmer.

Capacity is the gravest weakness. A regional assessment in 2019 found the Department of Water Affairs heavily understaffed. Most permit holders did not comply with their conditions, and the department lacked the means to enforce them. Monitoring of groundwater quality was at an early stage (SADC Groundwater Management Institute, 2019). That assessment is seven years old, and the position may have improved.

The parliamentary committee suggests that it has not improved enough. It reported in 2026 that Namibia has limited capacity to test and monitor radionuclides. It described a laboratory to be supplied by Rosatom as the only chance to monitor them properly (Agri Monitor, 2026).

That proposal should alarm every reader. A regulator that depends on the laboratory of the company it regulates is not a regulator. The same weakness allowed about 600 boreholes to be drilled before the permits were withdrawn in 2021.

Transparency is the fourth test. By August 2026 the IAEA had completed the review and submitted it to the government (Groenendaal, 2026). In early November the public still had no official copy, although a new drilling authorisation had been issued. SAUMA has asked for the authorisation, its conditions and the baseline data on water quality (Likoro, 2026). Those requests are reasonable.

The aquifer is not Namibian alone. About 73 per cent of the system lies in Namibia, 19 per cent in Botswana and eight per cent in South Africa (“Governance of Transboundary Aquifers,” n.d.). In August 2026 South African authorities had not yet requested the IAEA report (Groenendaal, 2026). The minister acknowledged in 2024 that international water law binds Namibia in this matter (Schlettwein, 2024).

The human stake is disputed only in its size. The minister told Parliament that the aquifer is the only water source for about 80,000 people in Omaheke and Hardap. The UNESCO project assessment estimated about 45,000 residents within the system area. The two figures use different boundaries and dates. Both confirm that no alternative supply exists.

One further gap deserves attention. No public statement reviewed for this article mentions a financial guarantee for restoration of the aquifer. The reviewers doubt the company’s restoration estimate. A state should not accept such a risk without security.

The question extends beyond Stampriet. The same division oversees the karst aquifers of the Grootfontein, Otavi and Tsumeb area, the Windhoek aquifer and the coastal aquifers of Omdel and Kuiseb. The 2019 assessment found that monitoring points were concentrated in a few basins and were not representative of the country (SADC Groundwater Management Institute, 2019). A precedent set at Leonardville will be invoked wherever minerals and groundwater meet.

The supporters of the project deserve a fair hearing. The parliamentary committee argues that leaching can be conducted safely under rigorous regulation. It notes that natural radionuclides already occur in the groundwater along the orebody. It points to jobs and revenue in a region that needs both (Agri Monitor, 2026). Each argument has merit. Each also depends on a regulator strong enough to verify it.

The verdict is plain. Namibia is ready to investigate the aquifer. It is not ready to license chemical leaching inside it. The phased path now adopted is correct, provided that the state, and not the developer, controls the evidence.

Uranium, Power and the New Scramble

Why does a pilot project in Omaheke attract such attention? The answer lies in the market.

World mines supplied about 90 per cent of reactor demand in 2024. Kazakhstan produced 39 per cent of mined uranium, Canada 24 per cent and Namibia 12 per cent. Namibia produced 7,333 tonnes (World Nuclear Association, 2026b). It is the third-largest producer in the world and the first in Africa.

That output is already committed largely to one buyer. Chinese state companies control the Husab and Rössing mines. Nearly all Namibian uranium went to China in 2024 (bne IntelliNews, 2026). In September 2026, a subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation bought 45 per cent of the venture that owns the Etango project (World Nuclear Association, 2026a).

Russia arrives late and wants a share. In March 2026, Moscow declared its interest in the Wings deposit and in nuclear energy cooperation with Namibia. Rosatom launched a pilot uranium facility in Tanzania in 2025, and Niger has invited it to mine (Interfax, 2026). At the October summit, Mr Likhachev named Namibia among the states interested in a small nuclear power plant (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, 2026).

The United States is also present. A Namibian state agency signed a memorandum with an American nuclear technology company in June 2025. In April 2026, American officials signalled interest in Namibian uranium and critical minerals (bne IntelliNews, 2026).

Three powers therefore court one small state for one metal. This is the economic war that readers sense behind the headlines. It is real. Its weapons are ownership, purchase contracts, finance and offers of reactors.

Is the IAEA review one of those weapons? The conduct of the West suggests otherwise. The United States banned imports of Russian enriched uranium in 2024, yet it allowed waivers. Russia still supplied about 26 per cent of enrichment services to American reactors in 2025. A sanctions bill passed by the House of Representatives in September 2026 exempted certain imports of Russian enriched uranium (Varah, 2026).

A country that still buys nuclear fuel services from Rosatom has little reason to sabotage a Rosatom borehole through a technical agency. States that wish to block a rival use sanctions and tariffs. They do not need hydrogeology.

The political use of the review is nonetheless visible on every side. Rosatom presents it as approval. The parliamentary committee described opposition to the project as sabotage and questioned the motives of farmers (Agri Monitor, 2026). SAUMA remains opposed to leaching anywhere in the basin (Likoro, 2026). Each camp claims science. Only publication of the full report can discipline those claims.

There is a deeper lesson. African leaders at the Moscow summit demanded that minerals be processed on the continent (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, 2026). The Namibian President made the same demand of Chinese partners in July 2026 (bne IntelliNews, 2026). Value addition is a just demand. It is empty without regulatory strength.

A state that cannot test its own groundwater cannot bargain as an equal. That holds whether the counterpart is Rosatom, a Chinese state firm or an American company. Sovereignty over minerals begins with sovereignty over data.

Namibia abstained in the United Nations vote on Ukraine in March 2022. Its government cited Article 96 of the Constitution, which bases foreign policy on nonalignment (Melber, 2022). That principle should now govern geology. One standard must apply to Russian, Chinese, Australian and American investors alike. The standard is proof before permission.

What Namibia Should Do Now

Eight steps follow from the evidence.

1. Publish the IAEA review in full, with the names and affiliations of the reviewers.
2. Publish the borehole authorisation, its conditions and the monitoring plan.
3. Build laboratory and monitoring capacity that the state owns and controls. The IAEA and UNESCO can assist.
4. Write the phased approach into binding licence conditions. No leaching chemical should enter the ground before confinement is independently verified.
5. Audit every borehole drilled since 2012. Seal defective boreholes at the cost of the developer.
6. Require a financial guarantee for restoration before any pilot begins.
7. Notify Botswana and South Africa formally, and share the data through the Orange–Senqu River Commission.
8. Apply the same rules to every investor, whatever flag it carries.

Conclusion

The evidence supports a clear conclusion. The reported findings are sound hydrogeology. They match what Namibian officials found in 2021 and what hydrologists recorded for the basin years earlier. They are not a plot against Russia. Russia helps to govern the agency that produced them, and Rosatom cites that agency as its witness.

The politics lies elsewhere. It lies in the race of great powers for African uranium. It lies also in the temptation of a small state to trade caution for investment. Namibia holds a strong hand. It has the ore that the world wants and a review that tells it what to demand.

Uranium can wait in the rock for another decade. Water that is poisoned cannot be recalled. The order of priorities is therefore water first, uranium second and flags last.

 Silas Mwaudasheni Nande is a Namibian school principal, doctoral candidate in education and analytical writer on African governance, public policy and international affairs.

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