By: Dennis Wendo
The resurgence of nascent militia and organized criminal gangs that has beset the country piles pressure on the local, peri-urban and urban communes, investors and the state security agencies. There is a need to delve deeper into the systemic surge and confront the menace with precision, lest it spirals into undesirable and more hurting effects.
The existence of non-state armed and community-based armed groups dates back to the pre and post-independence era. Many times these groups started off as community protection wings and gradually evolved into vigilantes.
Community-based armed groups are a subset of Non-state armed groups, elucidated by their link to the state and local communities and the ways they wield power. They do not typically go after large political ambitions and strategies, other than the confined goals of their collaborators. They can be aligned with the state for complementary roles, for instance the licensed private security providers and the promoters of Nyumba Kumi initiative. However, some tend to abuse their legitimacy, dominion and softly transition to non-state armed groups.
On the contrary non-state armed groups like Mungiki, Gaza, Panga Boys, 42 Brothers, Wakali Kwanza, Katalang, Kayole, Nabuyole Boys, Confirm, Jobless or terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Al- Qaeda seek to disrupt or undermine the state to take it over or put in place an alternative political system.
Either way these groups display a history of emerging in response to social, political and economic inequalities and the discontent they engender. The dreaded Chinkororo in the Abagusii community, whose initial motive was to guard the Gusii border residents against cattle raiding from the neighboring communities and arbitrate disputes, mutated to include elements of political violence. Like the Sungu Sungu from the same society, they are criminal gangs, vigilantes for economic and political hire by the highest bidder, instruments for mayhem and settling post-election scores.
The drivers and facets of motivation towards the genesis and perpetrators of insurgencies vary across regions. For instance, in Mombasa, historical Injustices, the government response to militia and proximity to the local administrative units have been in the forefront in catalyzing the formation of criminal gangs. In Mombasa, by contrast, drug lords involved in the international and highly profitable narcotics trade have both formal and informal security providers on their payroll.
In Nairobi, gun permeation has accelerated the rise of terror gangs. The size of militia and weapons of choice, police-militia symbiosis, relationship between militia and politicians and how the government deals with militia continue to play a role in the escalation of non-state armed groups across the country.
Largely, non-state armed groups are formed and hired by political actors for their own protection during rallies as well as hirelings to intimidate and attack political opponents. This precedent is dangerous and likely to yield more retaliatory counter terror gangs.
By and large, there exists a huge gap between the rich and the poor and subsequent marginalization due to ethnic-based politics and to certain extent culture and religion. A sizable number of Kenyans feel the country is headed in the wrong direction with cries of massive youths’ unemployment, high cost of living, use of security excesses and corruption.
Radicalization and violent extremism appears to be scaling up. The country is in a top gear electioneering mood. A majority of Kenyans feel depressed and stressed. Perhaps this has propelled the presence of at least an instance of activity by non-state armed groups in almost every region of the country as a substitute avenue to make their ends meet.
The April 2025 National Crime Research Centre report, portrays a concerning picture of the spread and impact of organized criminal gangs in Kenya, highlighting their role in various crimes and their potential threat to national security. According to the report, organized criminal groups increased from 33, banned in the year 2010 to 326 groups in 2017, reflecting an exponential growth of 897% within 7 years or 128% growth per annum.
The report further indicates that there are 309 criminal gangs in 11 counties, Mombasa leads with 73 followed by Nairobi 56 gangs and Kilifi 47. It details the prevalence and activities of criminal gangs, including those involved in terrorism, drug and human trafficking and cross border smuggling.
These unlawful groups broadly championed by youths aged between 18-34yrs continue to pose danger despite being banned under the Kenyan Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010.
The recent perpetual attacks to congregants in places of worship, political gatherings and residential areas is alarming. Open violence and robberies, extortion, misuse of drugs and substance abuse, burglary, muggings, looting, rape, destruction of property and murders have been reported courtesy of the gangs. There is a lot of growing fear and panic in the air and many feel the situation is likely to magnify ahead of the next general elections if not checked and dealt with decisively.
Though the state has given the assurance of normalizing the security situation in affected areas where the gangs appear to be on rampage, it remains salient for the government to focus on the root causes and catalysts of these insurgencies as well as strengthen the existing infrastructure and policies for a long term sustainable remedy.
Given the influence and growing presence and diversity of these groups, it is critical to adopt strategies on how well the non-state armed groups can be engaged, managed and transformed to play constructive roles in local communities as well as understand how their operations can exacerbate fragility and violence.
Notably, shifts in non-state armed groups identities and exercise of violence causes fictionalization within the groups, an indicator that not all members accept new modes of operating, especially if new norms challenge long-held organizational principles. In these transition moments, non-state armed groups are vulnerable, they can split apart, while certain factions may harden to commit acts of violence. The government should be poised to act in these transitional moments.
The government can seek to leverage different groups to control the increasingly hardened faction and further isolate and contain it as it attempts to consolidate and expand its organization. Any engagement strategy for the groups, needs to address the social norms of violence, the history of state or community management or manipulation of armed groups and their legitimacy.
Engagement strategies need to take into consideration the internal characteristics, such as sources of legitimacy and loyalty, leadership capacities, recruiting pool and institutional structures. A non-state armed group with extensive resources, whose members enjoy economic benefits, may be more attracted to employment-based or compensation-based transitions.
On the other hand, members motivated by an internal set of principles and norms may be more attracted to transition programs that are more spiritual, intellectual or rooted in community service, such as becoming an emergency response and rescue group.
As the government focuses at addressing the challenges being met by the non- state armed groups to its citizens, it remains crucial for the state to holistically conceive the intensity of these threats as a function of distance decay. This provides both space and time for non-state actors to undermine the state. Distance decay spawns’ security gaps, which if sustained, allow bandit groups to create and consolidate favorable spaces to the extent that they facilitate the nourishment and reproduction of bandit fields of accumulation.
There is a need to combine and strengthen policies rooted in the National security apparatus. These include internal security defence, foreign and economic policies. These have to be advanced and mobilized through instruments of national power to precisely deal with these threats and vulnerabilities.
Enhanced voluntary intelligence cooperation is imperative. Civic competence is key for any attempt to build up intelligence extraction from society. It is also critical to enhance citizen resistance to local criminals. The converse of this is the current phenomena referred to as security infantilization. This is characterized by situations where citizens are afraid to let the government protect them and instead opt to depend on criminals to create a permanent state of anxiety and counter institutional and symbolic violence.
There is a need for the state to boost its county intelligence security committees, the conception of jointness and leverage on modernized technology to tame insurgencies. Nations such as DR Congo, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia where terror gangs have taken control, the states have retrogressively sunk into anarchy and civil war bringing forth a lot of atrocities, gross human rights abuse to innocent citizens and a shutdown to systems of governance. The rule of law ought to prevail with financiers and agents of terror gangs held accountable by enforcing stringent fines, penalties, sanctions and jail terms.
Dennis Wendo
Integrated Development Network- Public Benefits Organization(PBO)
Email: idn.kenya@gmail.com
Fredrick Kipchumba Chelimo 
Jerameel Kevins Owuor Odhiambo 
Mt Kenya Times